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Russian discourses on international law: Sociological and philosophical phenomenon 
Edited by P. Sean Morris 
Part III Ethical borders and transplantation of law and morals 
Bill Bowring 
Russia and the Council of Europe: an incompatible ideology, and a transplanted legal regime? 
Introduction 
Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1996 and ratification of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1998 saw the beginning not only of a wholly new 
Russian discourse on international law, but also of an unprecedented immersion in it. It is no 
exaggeration to say that in the almost 20 years since ratification of the ECHR, Russian law 
and practice have become saturated with the principles and case-law emanating from 
Strasbourg. This remains the case whether or not Russia now “crashes out” of the COE as a 
result of sanctions suspending Russia’s participation in the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe following the annexation of Crimea in 20141; and despite the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (CCRF) finding in two recent cases2 that it 
was “impossible” for Russia to comply with judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR).3 Whereas the USSR had ratified and engaged with United Nations human 
rights instruments, notably the key UN human rights covenants and conventions4, these never 
impinged on the USSR’s sovereignty or the inviolable principle of non-interference in 
internal affairs, until, following a ruling of the USSR’s Committee for Constitutional 
                                                 
1 Russia may crash out of Council of Europe, says rights chief. If Russia keeps being excluded from the 
elections of key personnel at the Council of Europe, Moscow could leave the group. 9 April 2017. 
https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-may-crash-out-of-council-of-europe-says-rights-chief/ 
2 No. 12- П/2016, 19 April 2016; No. 1-П/201719 January 2017, and see  
https://rg.ru/2017/01/19/reg-szfo/konstitucionnyj-sud-rf-vynes-reshenie-po-delu-iukosa.html (accessed on 26 
December 2017) 
3 Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia, on prisoners’ voting rights, Applications nos. 11157/04 and 15162/05, 
judgment of 14 July 2013; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, application no. 14902/04, judgment 
(just satisfaction) of 31 July 2014. 
4 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ratified by the USSR 3 May 1954; 
CERD - International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratified 4 Feb 
1969; CCPR - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified 16 Oct 1973; CESCR - International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ratified 16 Oct 1973; CEDAW - Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, ratified 23 Jan 1981; CAT - Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ratified 3 Mar 1987; CRC - 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified 16 Aug 1990. See 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=144&Lang=EN (accessed on 
26 December 2017) 
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Supervision, on 1 October 1991, shortly before its demise just over a month later, the USSR 
accepted three individual complaints procedures5. 
Relations between Russia and the CoE are now fraught as never before.6 It is my contention 
that whatever happens – and Russia is as always entirely unpredictable – this intense 20 year 
experience will leave its indelible mark on Russia and its discourses on international law.  
Furthermore, I seek to show that ratification of the ECHR was never a question of 
transplantation, but of restoration of the “great legal reforms” of the 19th century.7 
In this chapter my strategy is that I start with the uncontestable empirical facts of the range of 
Russia’s commitments to and engagement to the CoE.  
Second, I present and comment on Russia’s public statements as to its own perception of the 
significance of the CoE and its accession in 1996. These must of course be taken together 
with the deep engagement of the Russian judicial system with Strasbourg: the two 
Resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation giving guidance to the Courts of 
General Jurisdiction, first the Resolution of 10 October 2003 ‘On application by courts of 
general jurisdiction of the commonly recognized principles and norms of the international 
law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation’8, and second the Resolution of 27 
June 2013 ‘On application of the European Convention on Human Rights by the courts of 
general jurisdiction.’9 Russia, according to a number of official pronouncements, has every 
intention of remaining in the CoE, for good reasons. 
Third, I return to the CoE and its post-WWII history. What is its ideology? Does it have one? 
Is it based on a view of “morals”? I show that two leading contemporary scholars, a political 
                                                 
5 CAT, Art.22 - Individual complaints procedure under the Convention against Torture; CCPR-OP1 - Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; CERD, Art.14 - Individual complaints 
procedure under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=144&Lang=EN (accessed on 
26 December 2017) 
6 See Bill Bowring, “Russian cases in the ECtHR and the question of implementation” in Lauri Mälksoo and 
Wolfgang Benedek Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Strasbourg Effect (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp.188-221 
7 See Bill Bowring “The problem of ‘legal transplantation’ and human rights”, Chapter 11, pp.183-206 in The 
Degradation of the International Legal Order? The Rehabilitation of Law and the Possibility of Politics 
(Abingdon, Routledge, 2008) 
8 Ruling of the Plenary session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No 5 ‘On application by courts 
of general jurisdiction of the commonly recognized principles and norms of the international law and the 
international treaties of the Russian Federation’ 10 October 2003 at 
www.supcourt.ru/catalog.php?c1=English&c2=Documents&c3=&id=6801 (accessed on 30 December 2017) 
9 Ruling of the Plenary session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No.21  ‘On Application of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 and Protocols 
thereto by the Courts of General Jurisdiction’ 27 June 2013. Available in English at 
www.supcourt.ru/catalog.php?c1=English&c2=Documents&c3=&id=9155 (accessed on 30 December 2017) 
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scientist and an historian, have demonstrated, in a number of widely cited works, very 
different although convergent accounts of the origin and provenance of the CoE and ECtHR. 
My title has a question mark, for good reason. If there is doubt as to whether the CoE has a 
distinct and unmistakeable ideology, is Russia any less ambiguous? It is perfectly proper to 
ask the question - what is Russia’s ideology? Indeed, Russian journals and mass media are 
full of scholarly and journalistic articles asking just these questions. My fourth section 
engages with the vexed question of legal transplants. 
I conclude by insisting that Russia from its origins in the expanding Moscow of the 16th 
century has been an integral part of the European political and legal orders, influencing and 
influenced by all the diverse currents of thought and action. And if Russia now seeks to see 
itself as essentially Eurasian, then the Western European states, with, almost all of them, their 
histories of global colonial predation, have still to come to terms with their significance and 
legacy.10 
Russia’s engagement with the Council of Europe 
Russia’s most controversial and high-profile engagement with the CoE is, as indicated above 
its ratification of the ECHR and frequent appearance as a defendant in the ECtHR. However, 
Russia is deeply embedded in a wide range of CoE activities. In a chapter concerning 
ideology, it is perhaps best to start with hard empirical facts. 
At the ceremony held in Strasbourg on February 28, 1996, to mark Russia's entry into the 
Council of Europe, the Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeniy Primakov, handed over the 
documents affirming Russia's adherence to the Council's Charter.11 He also signed the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the European Convention Against Torture, the 
European Charter on Local Self-Government, and the Framework Convention on Protection 
of National Minorities. I return to all of these below. 
He did this pursuant to the obligations placed upon Russia in Parliamentary Assembly 
Opinion 193 (1996) of January 25, 199612, confirmed in Committee of Ministers Resolution 
No. 96/2.13  Paragraph 7 of the PACE Opinion set out 12 respects in which Russia was 
                                                 
10 Bill Bowring “Did the States Which Founded the UN Have Liberal or Illiberal Governments?” (2016) Baltic 
Yearbook of International Law, Volume 15 (2015), 31-44, 
11 This is taken from Chapter 8, “Human Rights in the Yeltsin Period”, pp.140-173, in Bill Bowring Law, Rights 
and Ideology in Russia: Landmarks in the Destiny of a Great Power (Abingdon, Routledge, 2013), p.175 et seq 
12 http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=13932&lang=en (accessed on 29 
December 2017) 
13 https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=090000168062e4fa (accessed on 29 Decem,ber 
2017) 
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already seeking to conform with the fundamental principles of the Council of Europe (more 
precisely, as set out in Article 3 of the CoE Charter: “Every Member of the Council of 
Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and the enjoyment by all persons within 
its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and 
effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council….”)  
Under paragraph 10 of its Opinion, the Parliamentary Assembly noted that “the Russian 
Federation shares fully its understanding and interpretation of the commitments entered into 
as spelt out in paragraph 7, and intends…” followed by a detailed list of 25 commitments.14 
                                                 
14 10.1. to sign the European Convention on Human Rights at the moment of accession; to ratify the 
Convention and Protocols Nos. 1, 2, 4, 7 and 11 within a year; to recognise, pending the entry into force 
of Protocol No. 11, the right of individual application to the European Commission and the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the European Court (Articles 25 and 46 of the Convention); 
10.2. to sign within one year and ratify within three years from the time of accession Protocol No. 6 to 
the European Convention on Human Rights on the abolition of the death penalty in time of peace, and 
to put into place a moratorium on executions with effect from the day of accession; 
10.3. to sign and ratify within a year from the time of accession the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 
10.4. to sign and ratify within a year from the time of accession the European Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities; to conduct its policy towards minorities on the principles set 
forth in Assembly Recommendation 1201 (1993), and to incorporate these principles into the legal and 
administrative system and practice of the country; 
Opinion 193 (1996) 
10.5. to sign and ratify within a year from the time of accession the European Charter of Local Self- 
Government and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; to study, with a view to 
ratification, the Council of Europe's Social Charter; and meanwhile to conduct its policy in accordance 
with the principles of these conventions; 
10.6. to sign and ratify and meanwhile to apply the basic principles of other Council of Europe 
conventions - notably those on extradition; on mutual assistance in criminal matters; on the transfer of 
sentenced persons; and on the laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime; 
10.7. to settle international as well as internal disputes by peaceful means (an obligation incumbent 
upon all member states of the Council of Europe), rejecting resolutely any forms of threats of force 
against its neighbours; 
10.8. to settle outstanding international border disputes according to the principles of international law, 
abiding by the existing international treaties; 
10.9. to ratify, within six months from the time of accession, the agreement of 21 October 1994 
between the Russian and Moldovan Governments, and to continue the withdrawal of the 14th Army and 
its equipment from the territory of Moldova within a time-limit of three years from the date of signature of 
the agreement; 
10.10. to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE); 
10.11. to denounce as wrong the concept of two different categories of foreign countries, whereby 
some are treated as a zone of special influence called the "near abroad"; 
10.12. to negotiate claims for the return of cultural property to other European countries on an ad hoc 
basis that differentiates between types of property (archives, works of art, buildings, etc.) and of 
ownership (public, private or institutional); 
10.13. to return without delay the property of religious institutions; 
10.14. to settle rapidly all issues related to the return of property claimed by Council of Europe member 
states, in particular the archives transferred to Moscow in 1945; 
10.15. to cease to restrict - with immediate effect - international travel of persons aware of state 
secrets, with the exception of those restrictions which are generally accepted in Council of Europe 
member states, and to facilitate the consultation of archives kept in the Russian Federation; 
10.16. to ensure that the application of the CIS Convention on Human Rights does not in any way 
interfere with the procedure and guarantees of the European Convention on Human Rights; 
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In paragraph 11, these are further described as “commitments and understandings” - certainly 
not as “recommendations”.  
In my view, the main reason the Communist and nationalist majority in the State Duma voted 
in favour of accession to the CoE and ratification of the ECHR, was the fact that following 
the collapse of the USSR some 25 million ethnic Russians and Russian speakers were living 
outside the borders of the Russian Federation, and the CoE was seen as offering a 
comprehensive framework of opportunities for their protection.  
Of the more than 200 treaties promulgated by the CoE, Russia has, as of 27 December 2017, 
signed and ratified 63 treaties, has signed but not ratified 16, and has not signed 130.  One of 
the treaties signed but not ratified is the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages, the “Languages Charter”, which it signed on 10 May 2001. I was an expert for 
the Council of Europe and European Union Joint Programme designed to assist ratification 
by Russia. The project failed – this was not my fault. 
The CoE publishes a regularly updated overview of its Action in Russia.15 The highlights, 
which demonstrate the continuing intense relationship between Russia and the CoE, are: 
Prevention of torture 
The European Committee for the prevention of torture (CPT) visits places of detention (for 
juvenile or immigration detainees, police stations, psychiatric hospitals) in order to assess 
                                                 
10.17. to revise the law on federal security services in order to bring it into line with Council of Europe 
principles and standards within one year from the time of accession: in particular, the right of the 
Federal Security Service (FSB) to possess and run pre-trial detention centres should be withdrawn; 
10.18. to adopt a law on alternative military service, as foreseen in Article 59 of the constitution; 
10.19. to reduce, if not eliminate, incidents of ill-treatment and deaths in the armed forces outside 
military conflicts; 
10.20. to pursue legal reform with a view to bringing all legislation in line with Council of Europe 
principles and standards: in particular, Presidential Decree No. 1226 should be revised without delay; 
10.21. to extend its international co-operation to prevent - and eliminate the ecological effects of - 
natural and technological disasters; 
10.22. to sign and ratify within a year from the time of accession the General Agreement on Privileges 
and Immunities of the Council of Europe and its additional protocols; 
10.23. to co-operate fully in the implementation of Assembly Order No. 508 (1995) on the honouring of 
obligations and commitments by member states of the Council of Europe, as well as in monitoring 
processes established by virtue of the Committee of Ministers' Declaration of 10 November 1994 (95th 
session); 
10.24. to respect strictly the provisions of international humanitarian law, including in cases of armed 
conflict on its territory; 
10.25. to co-operate in good faith with international humanitarian organisations and to enable them to 
carry on their activities on its territory in conformity with their mandates. 
15 https://www.coe.int/et/web/portal/russian-federation (accessed on 27 December 2017) 
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how persons deprived of their liberty are treated.16 It gives no notice in advance, and CPT 
delegations, which include experienced prison manager, doctors and psychiatrists, have the 
right to visit any place of detention, to be admitted, and to see anything they want to see and 
speak to any person they wish. The Russian member of the CPT, to 2019, is Olga Noyanova, 
Head of the International Relations Section, Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman of the 
Russian Federation.  
Since ratification in 1998 the CPT has carried out 27 visits to Russia, 7 periodical and 20 ad 
hoc visits. 23 reports have been adopted, of which just 3 have been published (Russia has not 
accepted the automatic publication procedure). The CPT has made three Public Statements17 
on Russia, in 2001, 2003 and most recently 2007. This is the CPT’s “nuclear weapon”. The 
CPT continues its regular visits. From 30 November to 13 December 2016 a CPT delegation 
carried out a periodic visit to Russia, to review the measures taken in response to 
recommendations made by the Committee after its previous visits. Particular attention was 
paid to the treatment and conditions of detention of persons in police custody and penitentiary 
establishments, including remand prisoners, juveniles and prisoners serving life sentences. 
Further, the delegation examined the situation of patients held in civil and forensic 
psychiatric hospitals and of residents of social care homes.  The delegation chose to visit the 
following places of detention18 
In addition, from 28 November to 4 December 2017 a CPT delegation carried out an ad hoc 
visit to the Chechen republic, its 12th, to review the treatment of persons deprived of their 
liberty by the police. Another objective of the visit was to examine the effectiveness of 
                                                 
16 Although Russia has since 2013 - http://rm.coe.int/doc/0900001680697bd6 - not agreed to the publication of 
CPT reports, the CPT visits Russia regularly - https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/russian-federation.  
17 Under Article 10 (2) of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, if a State Party "fails to co-operate or refuses to improve the situation in the light of 
the Committee's recommendations, the Committee may decide, after the Party has had an opportunity to make 
known its views, by a majority of two-thirds of its members to make a public statement on the matter." 
18 : Police establishments: Temporary detention facility (IVS) of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the South-
Western Administrative District, Moscow; IVS at the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of Krasnoyarsk 
region; IVS No. 5, Krasnoyarsk; IVS at the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of Novosibirsk region;  
Penitentiary establishments: Pre-trial establishment (SIZO) No. 1 (“Matrosskaya Tishina”), Moscow; SIZO No. 
2 (“Butyrka”), Moscow; SIZO No. 5, Moscow (unit for juveniles); SIZO No. 1, Krasnoyarsk (unit for 
juveniles); SIZO No. 1, Perm; Strict-Regime Colony No. 1, Solikamsk, Perm region; Colony No. 2 (for life-
sentenced prisoners), Solikamsk. In addition, the delegation went to SIZO No. 1 in Novosibirsk in order to 
interview persons who had recently been in police custody. Psychiatric hospitals: Krasnoyarsk regional psycho-
neurological dispensary No. 1; Federal specialised psychiatric hospital with intensive supervision, Novosibirsk; 
Psychiatric hospital No. 3, Novosibirsk; Social care homes: Shilinka psycho-neurological boarding home, 
Krasnoyarsk region; Ob psycho-neurological boarding home, Novosibirsk region. 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/council-of-europe-anti-torture-committee-visits-the-russian-federation 
(accessed on 28 December 2017) 
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investigations into allegations of ill-treatment of detained persons by law enforcement 
officials. The delegation visited a number of police establishments, a SIZO and the 
Republican ForensicMedical Bureau in Grozny.19  
That is, the CPT organises an intrusive and wide-ranging programme of visits, putting the 
Russian penitentiary system under considerable pressure to comply and respond, which, by 
and large, it does. 
Fight against racism  
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) is an independent 
monitoring body which provides member States with concrete and practical advice on how to 
tackle problems of racism and intolerance in their country. Conclusions on the Russian 
Federation have been adopted on 28 November 1977, 16 March 2001, 16 December 2005, 20 
June 2013, and 17 March 2016.20 The last of these focused on issues in respect of which 
Russia had not implemented ECRI’s recommendations. ECRI was especially concerned at the 
prohibition on grounds of “extremism” of the sacred texts of non-traditional religious groups 
such as those of Jehovah’s Witnesses and certain Muslim groups. ECRI noted that the list of 
banned materials now exceeded 3000 texts.  
Protection of social rights  
The European Social Charter guarantees social and economic human rights. It was adopted in 
1961 and revised in 1996. The European Committee of Social Rights rules on the conformity 
of the situation in States with the European Social Charter, the 1988 Additional Protocol and 
the Revised European Social Charter. The Russian Federation signed the Revised European 
Social Charter on 14 September 2000 and ratified it on 16 October 2009, accepting 67 of the 
Revised Charter’s 98 paragraphs.21 It has not yet accepted the Additional Protocol providing 
for a system of Collective Complaints – only 15 of the COE’s 47 member states have done 
so. Since 2011 Russia has submitted 6 reports on the application of the Revised Charter. The 
6th report, which was submitted on 16/01/2017, concerned the accepted provisions relating to 
                                                 
19 Temporary Detention Facility (IVS) of Argun City Internal Affairs Division; IVS of Police Division No. 1 in 
Grozny (Leninskiy district); Police Division No. 2 in Grozny (Zavodskoy district); Shali District Internal Affairs 
Division and its IVS; Mesker-Yurt Police Station, Shali District; Headquarters and barracks of Special-Purpose 
Patrol-Sentry Police Regiment named after A. Kadyrov, Grozny. The delegation also went to SIZO No. 1 in 
Grozny in order to interview persons who had recently been in police custody.  
https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/council-of-europe-anti-torture-committee-visits-the-chechen-republic-of-the-
russian-federation (accessed on 29 December 2017) 
20 https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/russia/russianfederation_cbc_EN.asp? 
(accessed on 27 December 2017) 
21 https://rm.coe.int/16805ac116 (accessed on 27 December 2017) 
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Thematic Group 2 “Health, Social security and social protection”, namely: Articles 3, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 23, 30 of the Revised Charter. The Conclusions of the European Committee for Social 
Rights are to be published in January 2018.  
Protection of minorities  
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) provides for a 
monitoring system to evaluate how the treaty is implemented by State Parties. The Advisory 
Committee (AC) adopts recommendations to improve minority protection. In December 2016 
Russia submitted its Fourth Periodical Report to the AC. A delegation of the AC visited 
Tyumen, Kazan, Krasnodar and Moscow (group 1) and Murmansk and Moscow (group 2) 
from 16-24 October 2017 to evaluate progress.22  
Fight against corruption  
The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) monitors member states' compliance with 
the Council of Europe anti-corruption standards with the objective to improve the capacity of 
its members to fight corruption. The Fourth Evaluation Round took place in 2016, but the 
report on Russia remains confidential. Materials of the Third Compliance Round for Russia, 
in 2011, have been published.23 One of the five members elected to the GRECO Bureau for 
the 5th Evaluation Round starting in 2017 is Mr Aslan Yusufov nominated by Russia24, with 
colleagues from Croatia, France, Czech Republic, Switzerland, Slovenia and the UK.25 
Democracy through Law 
The European Commission for Democracy through Law - the Venice Commission - “plays a 
leading role in the adoption of constitutions that conform to the standards of Europe's 
constitutional heritage”. The Venice Commission has adopted some 41 Opinions on proposed 
Russian legislation, the most recent of which was published on 18 December 2017.26 The 
Russian members of the Commission are Ms Taliya Khabrieva, Director, Institute for 
                                                 
22 https://www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/-/russian-federation-fourth-cycle-delegation-visit (accessed on 27 
December 2017) 
23 https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/round-3 (accessed on 27 December 2017) 
24 Deputy Head of Department for Supervision over Compliance of the Anti-Corruption Legislation of the 
Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation   
https://eng.genproc.gov.ru/smi/news/news-1146570/?print=1&ELEMENT_ID=1146570 (accessed on 27 
December 2017) 
25 https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/home (accessed on 27 December 2017) 
26 http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?country=26&year=all (accessed on 27 December 2017) 
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Legislation and Comparative Law, and the former Russian Judge at the ECtHR, Anatoliy 
Kovler.27 
There are several Russians in senior positions in the Secretariat of the CoE. Among them is 
Mikhail Borisovich Lobov, with whom I have been acquainted since 1996, who is now the 
Head of the Human Rights Policy and Co-operation Department in Directorate General I, 
Human Rights and Rule of Law. Another is Olga Sergeyevna Chernyshova, Head of Section 
in the Secretariat of the ECtHR. The continuing investment by the Russian government in 
reporting and representation at Strasbourg, involving a wide spectrum of government 
ministries and agencies cannot be underestimated. Nor can the focus this gives for civil 
society in Russia, which despite all obstacles put in its way continues a tireless monitoring of 
the activities of the authorities.  
In an important article published in 200328, the Canadian historian Pamela Jordan reviewed 
the experience of Russian membership for the previous seven years, including its willingness 
to pay compensation in respect of decisions of the ECtHR with which it profoundly 
disagreed, and to bring about certain required reforms, and concluded that “countries such as 
the Russian Federation appear to be motivated more to guard their existing interests in areas 
their governments have defined as national security concerns than to meet obligations and 
take part in social learning. Compliance tends to occur largely for instrumentalist reasons, 
and arguably the Council of Europe has been forced to adjust its expectations to justify 
keeping these members onboard.”29 
And in 2009 the political scientist and lawyer Alexei Trochev sought to assess the impact of 
ECtHR decisions on Russia.30 He argued that the Russian judiciary may be the most 
Strasbourg-friendly branch of the Russian government.31 His conclusion, based on detailed 
empirical research, was very much in line with my own impressions, but perhaps surprising 
for those who receive an unremittingly gloomy picture of Russia. 
… the impact of the Strasbourg court’s judgments on Russia is hard to exaggerate. 
Symbolically, it remains the most powerful court in the eyes of many Russians: week 
                                                 
27 http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/members/default.aspx?lang=EN (accessed on 27 December 2017) 
28 Pamela A. Jordan “Does Membership Have Its Privileges?: Entrance into the Council of Europe and 
Compliance with Human Rights Norms” Human Rights Quarterly Volume 25, Number 3, August 2003 pp. 660-
688, at  
29 Jordan (2003) ibid, p.688 
30 Alexei Trochev “All Appeals Lead to Strasbourg? Unpacking the Impact of the European Court of Human 
Rights on Russia” Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 145-178, Spring 2009; Univ. of Wisconsin Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 1082 
31 Trochev (2009) ibid, p.146 
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after week, the mass media informs them that the ECtHR routinely rules against the 
Russian government and that the government promptly pays out compensation 
awarded by this tribunal to all successful applicants. This remains true, although very 
few government officials are actually punished for committing the human rights 
violations, as identified by the Strasbourg tribunal. Moreover, the mere threat of 
litigation from the ECtHR forces government officials to take care of complainants, 
even if they do so half-heartedly, on a case-by-case basis, and only when following 
orders from the top. Responding to losses in Strasbourg, Russia witnessed a flurry of 
legislative activity, as well as increased funding for the prison system and the judicial 
branch. 
I have shown in perhaps too much detail, but with references to a great deal more, that Russia 
is fully engaged in the structures and mechanisms of the CoE. That is, Russia is immersed in 
international law of a kind which does not permit mere window-dressing, but requires 
constant action and reaction. Russia’s law and practice change significantly as a result, and in 
turn Russia participates in the development of international law.  
Russia’s view of the Council of Europe; and the impact on Russian law and practice of 
the work of the European Court of Human Rights 
The CoE rarely figures in President Putin’s discourse except as an irritant, particularly with 
regard to Crimea and Donbas. And 2018 will see a number of controversial ECtHR 
judgments against Russia, particularly with regard to the 2008 war with Georgia – another 
CoE member.  
On 3 March 2016 Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister published an article entitled 
“Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background” in the journal “Russia in Global Affairs”.32 
He started with an observation with which I entirely agree: 
History doesn’t confirm the widespread belief that Russia has always camped in 
Europe’s backyard and has been Europe’s political outsider. I’d like to remind you 
that the adoption of Christianity in Russia in 988 – we marked 1025 years of that 
event quite recently – boosted the development of state institutions, social relations 
and culture and eventually made Kievan Rus a full member of the European 
community. At that time, dynastic marriages were the best gauge of a country’s role 
in the system of international relations. In the 11th century, three daughters of Grand 
Prince Yaroslav the Wise became the queens of Norway and Denmark, Hungary and 
France. Yaroslav’s sister married the Polish king and granddaughter the German 
emperor. 
However, his account of subsequent history stresses the greatness of the Russian Empire and 
the disaster of the 1917 Revolution. For him the acme of Russian power was the reign of 
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Catherine II, “… when, as then Chancellor Alexander Bezborodko put it, ‘Not a single 
cannon in Europe could be fired without our consent.’”. Following 1991, “Logically, we 
should have created a new foundation for European security by strengthening the military and 
political components of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)… 
Unfortunately, our Western partners chose differently. They opted to expand NATO eastward 
and to advance the geopolitical space they controlled closer to the Russian border. This is the 
essence of the systemic problems that have soured Russia’s relations with the United States 
and the European Union.” He did not mention the Council of Europe at all. Nor has he done 
so, except in passing, for several years. 
In the context of the on-going tension between Russia and the CoE, it is therefore instructive 
to consider the interview given by Russia’s Permanent Representative (Ambassador) to the 
Council of Europe, Ivan Soltanovsky, to the official daily Rossiyskaya Gazeta, published on 
September 14, 2017.33 He started by emphasising that “For over 20 years Russia, together 
with the UK, Germany, Italy, France and in recent years also Turkey, has been a member of 
the group of “principal contributors” to the budget of the Council of Europe which have 
shouldered the bulk of responsibility for the organisation’s future… [we have] suspended the 
payment of the 2017 dues to the Council of Europe until the rights of the Russian Federal 
Assembly at PACE, which are stipulated by the Council of Europe’s Charter, are fully 
restored.” He insisted that  
… an information war with respect to Russia is underway in the West and our policy 
in the Council of Europe often becomes the subject of questionable political 
speculation…  the West European members of the Council of Europe expected that 
after Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe it would as if by magic fit into the 
Procrustean bed of Western political morality. As is only natural, this did not happen. 
Regrettably, the EU Expanding Europe concept has gained supporters in the West, 
which is about the European Union’s domination and central role on the European 
continent. Against its will, the Strasbourg organisation has found itself on the 
sidelines. 
He did not expand on his understanding of the “Procrustean bed”, nor did he offer an opinion 
as to the nature of “Western Political morality”. I suspect that he had in mind the constant 
Russian assertion that the West is guilty of hypocrisy and “double standards” – a phrase 
which find its way into almost every official Russian statement concerning relations with the 
West. However, he insisted on Russia’s continued commitment to the CoE, and I hope I will 
be forgiven for citing this passage from his long interview:  
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I do not see any real alternative to the Council of Europe in Europe. Against the 
background of an emerging chronic crisis of other European institutions, the current 
political situation in Europe is giving the Council of Europe a chance to become a true 
centre of attraction for the entire continent. But for this, it should give up politicking, 
display the political will and, giving the Council of Europe a real “shake,” set a course 
for cleansing the Strasbourg organisation of the backlog of double standards in all soft 
security areas…  
We have achieved the main goal of our joining the Council of Europe: we have 
benefited from the positive experience of other countries’ development in many areas 
and also presented our vision of European development as well as our experience of 
ethnic relations to the community of nations that are represented in the Council of 
Europe. Over a period of the 20 years of our work at the council, Russia has joined 
over 60 legally binding conventions plus protocols of this organisation. We have 
amended our laws on corruption, for example, we have criminalised trading in 
influence and corrupt payment, as well as created mechanisms for interaction among 
the Council of Europe’s counterterrorism agencies. There is no alternative to 
cooperation between Russia and Western countries, because we are geographic 
neighbours with a centuries long shared history, even if some people refuse to 
remember this.  
Here is another example of official Russian discourse concerning the CoE, also mixing 
regretful dissatisfaction with warm endorsement. The official web-site of the Embassy of the 
Russian Federation in London presents a fascinating overview of “Russia and the Council of 
Europe”.34 It starts: 
The Council of Europe has risen from the ashes of the World War II. Its activities in 
the humanitarian domain are aimed at ensuring security of every European in its 
broader meaning. The better the guarantees of the social conditions of the human life 
are, the better the rights record is, the stronger the economy is, the more protected the 
individual is in society, the less reasons he or she has to resolve problems using force. 
In the conditions of the current crisis this is felt especially strongly…  the very 
concept of security has undergone qualitative transformation. The question is no 
longer about hostile States, against which old-style coalitions have to be created… it 
is the unresolved problem of hard security, the relict agenda of the Cold War era, that 
hampers the effective development of such cooperation. 
This is followed by fulsome praise for the CoE, followed by Russia’s perception that the true 
objective of the suspension of the voting rights of Russia’s delegation to PACE is – the 
subordination of the CoE to the European Union and to NATO: 
The Council has proven its effectiveness not only in such critical areas as human 
rights, the rule of law, and the strengthening of democracy. It also contributes 
substantively to dealing with problems associated with new threats and challenges: 
terrorism, money laundering and corruption – these are all major issues to which the 
Council devotes heightened attention. 
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The proposals to diminish the mandate and competence of our Organization are 
inadmissible, as well as the attempts to limit its independence, transform the Council 
of Europe into a subsidiary body of the other European structures. The Strasburg 
Organization must be the leading European lawmaker in the proper sense of the word. 
For this reason, Russia is especially keen on the accession of the EU to the ECHR and its 
representation on the ECtHR, as specified in Protocol 14 to the ECHR, and the Lisbon Treaty 
of the EU.  
We also favor the European Union’s speedy accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, based on the recognition by the EU of the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights on terms that are subject to ratification by all 47 member of 
the Council of Europe. We proceed from the fundamental importance of the fact that 
such an agreement would fully ensure the preservation of the supremacy of the 
European Convention on Human Rights for all of the Council of Europe area, and the 
central role of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to any breach of the 
Convention, no matter by whom: EU members or non members, the EU itself or its 
bodies and institutions. 
Thus, a persistent and consistent message from Russia is that the CoE and ECtHR, of which 
Russia is a member, present the possibility of countering the inexorable expansion of the EU, 
of which it will never be a member. 
Russia now has a new representative at the European Court of Human Rights, Mikhail 
Lvovich Galperin, relatively young to have been appointed, on 19 May 2017, to this position, 
and to the rank of Deputy Minister of Justice, closely following signing into law by President 
Putin, on 5 May 2017, of Russia’s ratification of Protocol 15 to the ECHR.35 Mr Galperin 
replaced Georgiy Matyushkin, who served for 9 years. Mr Galperin was born in 1983, and 
graduated in law from St Petersburg State University, with an LLM in Law from University 
of London (UCL and QMW) in 2010. His doctoral thesis was entitled “Responsibility in 
contemporary civil procedure”. He has acted as a Judicial Assistant in the USA, and worked 
for several years in the audit department of Ernst and Young.36 He, like the Russian judge at 
Strasbourg, Dmitriy Dedov, is primarily a commercial lawyer. 
In September 2017 Mr Galperin’s boss, Alexandr Konovalov, the Minister of Justice of the 
Russian Federation, visited Strasbourg and met Guido Raimondi, President of the ECtHR, 
and Thorbjørn Jagland, Secretary General of the CoE. The press report of his visit referred to 
information he had given in February 2017: the ECtHR had become much more focused on 
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paying attention to the problems of law enforcement in the Russian Federation. In 2016, the 
ECtHR  received 5,500 complaints from Russia - 7% fewer than in 2015. However, the 
number of complaints communicated to Russia increased by 400 (up to 1,700), and the 
number of rulings in respect of Russia increased to 238 (in 2015 - 116). As to the number of 
complaints submitted to the ECtHR per capita from the 47 countries of the CE, Russia is in 
the 30th position. The annual number of complaints from Russia to the ECHR has reduced by 
more than half in five years (from 10-12,000 a year in 2011-2012), and the number of 
complaints pending against Russia in the ECtHR has dropped more than fourfold in four 
years - from 40,300 to 7,800 complaints.37 Earlier, the Ministry of Justice sent to the 
Committee of Ministers of the CE reports on payments to applicants in the ECHR 
compensation for more than 424 million rubles. 
Without doubt, the intended message is that Russia is no longer, if it ever was, an outlier in 
the CoE and ECHR system, but increasingly a normal European country.  
It was in this vein that on 20 December 2017 Mr Galperin gave an exclusive interview to the 
legal web portal legal.report.38 He started by insisting that  
Russia’s participation in the ECtHR and the ECHR is a positive experience. Many 
important changes in our laws were the result of implementation of judgments of the 
ECtHR. For example, the well known case Burdov v Russia [the first “pilot judgment” 
against Russia] as to the execution of judicial decisions against the government. Also 
the protection of people in detention, and the improvement of their conditions of 
detention, and many other questions.  
I repeat: our legal system for the last 20 years has developed largely under the 
influence of the ECtHR decisions. Without too much pathos I can say that 
participation in the ECtHR mechanism allows Russia not only to remain in the 
European legal field, but also to participate with some success in its formation and 
development. 
This information has been substantiated by the CoE itself.39 In 2016 PACE, assisted by the 
Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex, published a report on the impact of the 
ECHR in various countries40. The Report identified a number of instances of positive impact.  
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• As a result of the pilot judgement in Burdov v Russia in 2009 over non-enforcement 
of a domestic court judgement in favour of the applicant, Russia enacted a Federal 
Compensation Act, as well as a Federal Law to guarantee the effectiveness of the new 
remedy.  
• In 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation followed up the CoM’s 2004 
Declaration and extended journalists’ freedom of expression to criticism of public 
officials: public officials must accept that they will be subject to public scrutiny and 
criticism. In 2008 the Court closed a number of applications in view of this change. 
• Following Mikheyev v. Russia (2006) and other, similar, judgements, on account of 
torture or inhuman and degrading treatment inflicted on persons held in police 
custody, and a lack of effective investigations into such acts, special investigation 
units were created within the Investigative Committee, tasked with investigating 
particularly complex crimes by police and other law enforcement bodies. 
• There had been progress in the implementation of the Court’s 2012 pilot judgement in 
Ananyev and Others v. Russia concerning inhuman and degrading conditions in 
Russian remand centres and the lack of an effective remedy. Russia presented and has 
been implementing an action plan as a result, monitored by the CoM. 
• A number of measures have been taken to remedy numerous violations of the right to 
liberty, guaranteed by Article 5 of the Convention, owing to unlawful and lengthy 
unreasoned (or poorly reasoned) detention on remand. Legislative changes were made 
between 2008 and 2011. Both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court have 
emphasized that a suspect or accused may be detained only on the basis of a valid 
judicial decision. This was most recently monitored by the CoM in 2015. 
Did the Council of Europe have its origins in “Western morality”? 
In this section I present and discuss the recent work of two leading scholars of the CoE and 
human rights, Andrew Moravcsik, a political scientist,41 and Samuel Moyn, an historian42. It 
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is curious that neither refers to the other – but their standpoints and analyses are markedly 
different if in the end convergent. 
Starting in 1995, before Russia joined the CoE, Moravcsik asked the question “Under what 
conditions are effective international regimes for the promotion of human rights likely to 
emerge?”.43 He identified a mechanism of “shaming”.44 He noted the high level of compliance 
with judgments of the ECtHR45, and that only in the 1980s did the system begin to develop 
extensive constitutional case-law. He put this delay down to the fact that ratification of the 
instrument and adherence to various of its specific provisions was voluntary.  
Moravcsik returned to these questions in 1998.46 Now the question was posed as follows: 
Why would governments establish an arrangement that invades domestic sovereignty in this 
way? He distinguished between two main explanatory methods: the realist view which 
asserts that the most powerful democracies seek to externalize their values, coercing or 
enticing weaker and less democratic governments to accept human rights regimes, and the 
ideational view which argues that the most established democracies externalize their values, 
setting in motion a transnational process of diffusion and persuasion that socializes less 
democratic governments to accept such regimes. The ideational view was linked to liberalism 
and constructivism, and was characterised by a commitment to the transformative power of 
normative discourse and ideals. 
As against these, he proposed an institutional liberal view, and maintained that governments 
delegate for a self-interested reason, namely to combat future domestic political uncertainty. 
Therefore it was “not the most powerful or persuasive democracies, but weakly established 
democracies that favor enforceable (as opposed to merely rhetorical) human rights 
obligations, because such commitments help lock in democratic governance against non-
democratic domestic opposition.”47 These theories were to be tested in respect of the ECHR. 
Looking closely at the diplomatic and other records, he concluded that “the strongest postwar 
advocates of binding human rights guarantees were recently re-established democracies, 
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while more established democracies like Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark 
uniformly sided with transitional regimes like Greece and Turkey in opposition to binding 
guarantees.” 
The timing of the negotiations in 1949 was, in his view, consistent with all three theories—
realist, idealist, and liberal. “The first decade after World War II was one of emergent bipolar 
conflict, powerful democratic great powers, salient historical reminders of human rights 
violations, and the reestablishment of democratic governance.”48 He noted that “Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, and Italy supported creation of a Court of 
Human Rights and mandatory jurisdiction, while Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom were opposed to anything 
except a court whose jurisdiction remained optional.”49 Following analysis he argued that 
“There is almost no support for the realist or ideational view that the most democratic (or the 
most powerful) countries support human rights guarantees.”50 His conclusion was  
The most striking finding of this study—given the dominant role of altruistic 
motivations in nearly every scholarly treatment of human rights—is the near-total 
absence of evidence in favor of altruistic motivations or transnational socialization, 
once the analysis is properly controlled for sophisticated forms of self-interest.51 
Moravcsik followed this analysis in an article published in 200052 (in which Russia was 
identified as a “transitional regime”)53 and in which he repeated that the origins of the ECHR 
lay in “self-interested efforts by newly established (or reestablished) democracies to employ 
international commitments to consolidate democracy - "locking in" the domestic political 
status quo against their nondemocratic opponents…”.54  
Moravcsik’s articles on this topic have been widely cited, but perhaps best summed up by 
Mikael Rask Madsen in 2011: 
The original Convention had mainly sought to ensure liberal democracy in Europe. As 
argued by Andrew Moravcsik, the goal of the 1950 [ECHR] was predominantly to 
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‘lock in democratic governance against future opponents” and was by no means ‘a 
conversion to moral altruism’ of the Member States. 55  
This was a “Cold war-inspired objective” - “the goal was hardly to alter substantially the 
protection of human rights in the Member States but collectively to guarantee against a return 
to totalitarianism in Western Europe.” 
Or as the late Ian Brownlie and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill put it in their introduction to the ECHR 
in their collection of human rights documents, referring to “… the Council of Europe, an 
organisation created in 1949 as a sort of social and ideological counterpart to the military 
aspects of European cooperation represented in [NATO]. The Council of Europe was inspired 
partly by interest in the promotion of European unity and partly by the political desire for 
solidarity in the face of the ideology of Communism.”56  
Samuel Moyn caused a sensation in 2010 with his revisionist account of the history of human 
rights, as the “Last Utopia”.57 Perhaps his most provocative assertion was that “the drama of 
human rights is that they emerged in the 1970s, seemingly from nowhere”.58 He was able to 
give a more precise date: “The year of human rights, 1977, began with Carter’s January 20 
inauguration, which put “human rights” in front of the viewing public for the first time in 
American history.”59 Furthermore, Moyn insisted that the 1789 Déclaration de Droits de 
l’Homme et du Citoyen was actually a political document about citizenship, and had nothing 
to do with the real human rights which emerged in the 1977. Turning to the CoE and the 
ECHR, Moyn referred to the “preeminent role Christianity could play in the postwar framing 
of human rights”60, and to the “…sheer authenticity and passion with which Christian and 
conservative championship of “human rights” took place…”61 He added that for many 
proponents of European human rights “… human rights, far from originating in 1789, were a 
Christian bequest to be defended against the legacy of the French Revolution – or even 
revolution as such – that still threatened.”62 He identified “political and civil rights, prioritized 
as the essence of Western European identity” and insisted that “… it would be a gross error to 
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assume that the language of human rights, let alone the law of human rights mattered much in 
the beginning, The European Convention involved much more ideological signalling about 
the values on which Western European identity depended than it did legally enforceable 
guarantees.”63 
Moyn and Moravcsik, it seems to me, from their North American perspective, fail to note the 
striking fact that the ECHR follows the language of the 1789 Déclaration almost word for 
word, or the horror with which Edmund Burke, Jeremy Bentham and A. V. Dicey in England 
identified the intellectual terrorism of the Rights of Man – a horror which persists to the 
present day in English reluctance to countenance the ECHR.64  Dicey, writing at the end of 
the 19th century reserved his sharpest criticism for the persistence of the 1789 Déclaration in 
the contemporary French and Belgian constitutions. 
For sure, as Moyn asserts,  
From the beginning the energy in the movement to defend and define human rights as 
the essence of European civilisation in the European Convention came from 
conservatives – Churchill and his allies out or power, anxious about the spectre of 
socialism at home, and opposite numbers on the Continent worried about the 
impending triumph of materialism over spiritual values.65 
This is to confirm the ideological, Cold War, content of the CoE and ECHR at their origin. 
But I contend that the revolutionary and scandalous – for common lawyers – content of the 
ECHR, with its roots in the 1789 Déclaration, has re-emerged in the cases against the UK 
concerning Northern Ireland and Iraq, the Kurdish cases against Turkey, and the Chechen 
cases against Russia.66 
Moyn has pursued his investigation of the Christian origins of human rights in the Mellon 
lectures he gave at the University of Pennsylvania, published in 2015 as Christian Human 
Rights.67 His message is, as explained in his blog, that “my general thesis has been that 
through this lost and misremembered transwar era, it is best to see human rights as a project 
of the Christian right for the most part, not the secular left.”68  
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In a long Critical review article first published in The Hedgehog Review in 2016, Ronald 
Osborn referred to Moyn’s thesis as “Conservatism by other means”, and shows a number of 
Moyn’s claims to be selective or even false.69 In 2017 The Kings Law Journal published a 
symposium on Christian Human Rights. In his Introduction70, Moyn made the claim that 
“The truth is that Europe and therefore the modern world drew nearly everything from 
Christianity in the long term.”71 This is, of course, as true of Russia, which took Orthodoxy 
from Byzantium, as it is of any European country. The problem is that throughout his recent 
interventions, when Moyn says “Christianity”, he means Catholicism. His focus is Pope Pius 
XII, who was, very controversially, Pope from 1939 to 1958.  
In his reply, Moyn states as follows: 
Something extraordinary has happened to the Christian faith of Western Europeans, 
for good or ill. Whether my commentators are coy, critical or celebratory about these 
developments, all agree that human rights have largely outlived their Christian phase - 
even if without the influence of Christianity at a specific juncture in its recent history, 
people might have had to find something else to believe in.72 
My own conclusion is also that there is no monolithic Western European morality or ideology 
against which some Russian discourse is to be counterposed. And most certainly not some 
Western European “Christianity”. 
Transplants?73 
The theory of legal transplantation is a crucial domain within the theory of legal 
comparativism. The debate concerning ‘legal transplants’ can be said to have begun in 
earnest in an exchange between Alan Watson and Otto Kahn-Freund in the 1970s.74 There is 
now an extensive and growing scholarly literature on legal transplants, especially as concerns 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Most of it – with a few exceptions – concerns 
commercial law. Thus, Frédérique Dahan wrote:  
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What is indisputable is that for the legal systems of Central and Eastern Europe, 
transplantation is a reality. Because transition economies cannot afford and do not 
wish to go through the same process of slow and tentative development as the 
developed economies did in the past in order to achieve their modern legal and 
regulatory structures, they must, to a large extent, import them.75 
But importing a legal doctrine, mechanism or even a statute is not the same as importing an 
automobile; and even the automobile may need adapting for left-hand driving. Scott Newton, 
commenting on Dahan’s remark, points out that: 
. . . the very term ‘transplantation’, biased towards the technical, masks the political 
realities, for ‘legal transplantation’ is always necessarily a species of the genus 
legislation. That is, even supposing a jurisdiction decides to import a foreign law lock, 
stock and barrel, it nonetheless must enact it, with all the sovereign political 
implications any enactment brings . . . in transplantation as in transition, the emphasis 
on product over process works to privilege legality over legitimacy.76 
Most writers on transplantation, for the most part transplants in the commercial arena, do not 
share Newton’s sensitivity to the issues.  
No one can question the transformation of the Russian legal system since the mid-1980s - and 
especially since 1991, with accession to the CoE in 1996, and ratification of the ECHR in 
1998. But it should be obvious that, especially in the spheres of constitutional and human 
rights, Russia has not been importing US models. Instead, it has, through its own choice, 
drawn closer once more to the Western European mainstream.  
The question is: what was there before? Was there a ‘legal culture’ simply anathema to 
human rights? Was Russia simply the home of backwardness and despotism? Is it really the 
case that the Russians are condemned to catching up with the enlightened West from a 
position of legal barbarism? To answer these questions, the historical perspective is essential. 
I suggest just two examples.  
Serfdom, krepostnoye pravo, was abolished in Russia in 1861. Slavery was finally abolished 
in the USA in 1866 – the American Anti-Slavery Society was founded in 1833.  
Jury trial was introduced in a number of Western European countries at about the same time 
as in Russia, 1864, though it had been strongly advocated by leading law reformers from the 
late eighteenth century. Jury trial was from 1993 available in nine of Russia’s 85 regions, and 
since the enactment of the Criminal Procedural Code in 2000 has been extended to the rest of 
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the country, including Chechnya. 77 This is not an innovation forced on Russia after defeat in 
the Cold War. It is the restoration of an effective system of jury trial for all serious criminal 
cases, presided over by independent judges, which existed in Russia from 1864 to 1917. 
Marina Nemytina, although pessimistic for the future of jury trial in today’s Russia, insisted 
that in 1993 “The first trials by jury were heralded as the reestablishment of the institution in 
Russia. Trial by jury was represented as not something borrowed from the West in the course 
of the democratic changes, but as a native legal tradition that was being revived.”78  
What is frequently neglected is any recognition of Russia’s own prerevolutionary traditions, 
especially the reforms of Alexander II (1855–1881).  Starting with the revolutionary Law on 
Emancipation of the Serfs in 1861, these reforms culminated in the Laws of 20 November 
1864.79 The new Laws introduced a truly adversarial criminal justice procedure, and made 
trial by jury obligatory in criminal proceedings. Judges were given the opportunity to 
establish real independence, in part by freeing them of the duty to gather evidence, and 
enabling them to act as a free umpire between the parties. The Prokuracy lost its powers of 
‘general review of legality’, and became a state prosecutor on the Western model. The 
institution of Justices of the Peace was introduced. It is ironical that the Bolsheviks reinstated 
the pre-reform model of the Prokuracy. 
Indeed, as Samuel Kucherov wrote in 1953: ‘Between 1864 and 1906, Russia offered the 
example of a state unique in political history, where the judicial power was based on 
democratic principles, whereas the legislature and executive powers remained completely 
autocratic.’80 A collection on jury trial in Russia contains an extensive memoir by one of the 
most distinguished judges of the period, A. F. Koni.81 Moreover, it also reproduces the 
advocates’ speeches and judicial summings-up in some of the most famous trials, for example 
the trial in 1878 of Vera Zasulich, charged with the attempted murder of the governor of St 
Petersburg, Trepov, whom she had shot in broad daylight and before witnesses. Koni, who 
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was presiding judge, refused to be pressured by the authorities, and Zasulich was acquitted, a 
verdict which was respected by the authorities. 
It is noteworthy that in the major speeches made to legal audiences at the start of his 
presidency, Putin referred to just these issues. His speech of 24 January 200082 was delivered 
in his then capacity of Acting President to a colloquium of leaders of Republic, Krai, and 
Oblast Courts. His main theme was the independence of the judiciary. He quoted Judge Koni, 
and referred to the necessity for correspondence with generally recognised norms of 
international law. Most important, he made explicit reference to the ratification by Russia of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which had therefore 
become a constituent part of the Russian legal system. Above all, he said, the jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Human Rights had been recognised. Therefore special attention must 
be given to those problems of the Russian judicial system that were likely to call forth a 
reaction from the European Court.  
In order to understand these processes, we should look deeper still into Russian history and 
traditions. Gross errors by US and other Western legal experts and commentators would be 
avoided by the realisation that judicial independence, adversarial court proceedings and trial 
by jury are not recent imports from the liberal West to the uncultured East, but the 
reinstatement of a rich and specifically Russian experience. 
This history begins at a climactic time for the UK and for Western Europe, and with a 
surprise for Western scholars. A textbook on legal thought83 points out that the first Russian 
professor of law, S. E. Desnitskiy (1740–1789), was a product not so much of the French 
Enlightenment, that is of Diderot and Rousseau, but of the Scottish Enlightenment. 
Desnitskiy studied in Scotland, under Adam Smith and others, from 1761 to 1767, when he 
received a Doctorate of Civil and Church Law from the University of Glasgow. He was much 
influenced by the ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment, especially by the philosophy of David 
Hume, and especially by the Scottish emphasis on Roman Law traditions and principles – the 
focus of Alan Watson’s pathbreaking work on legal transplants.84 On the basis of his lengthy 
researches in Scotland, in 1768 Desnitskiy sent the Empress Catherine II his ‘Remarks on the 
institutions of legislative, judicial and penitentiary powers in the Russian Empire’ – however, 
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his suggestions were entirely unacceptable, and the work was sent to the archives. Among 
other radical proposals, Desnitskii urged the abolition of serfdom. He survived Catherine’s 
rejection of these ideas, and became a full professor of law in 1777, shortly after the 
Pugachev uprising. He published books introducing Russians to the ideas of Adam Smith and 
John Millar. At Catherine’s own instruction, he translated into Russian volume 1 of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, and this was published in Moscow in 1780–1783. His courses 
included the history of Russian law, Justinian’s Pandects, and comparisons of Roman and 
Russian law.85 He died in the year of the French Revolution, and the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen. 
It should be noted that Desnitskiy did not undertake a simple transmission of some already 
existing Western liberalism to Russia. The period of his work was as much the period of the 
revolt of reason against autocracy in England as in Russia. Desnitskiy was born only a few 
years after Thomas Paine.86 
V. S. Solovyev (1853–1900) was the next Russian to think deeply about issues of rights. He, 
like Radishchev, was not a lawyer, and his approach, while committed to enlightenment 
values, had a specifically religious focus to it. This spiritual, idealistic dimension to Russian 
rights discourse is characteristic and a specific and unique contribution. B. N. Chicherin 
(1828–1904) was the first lawyer to work through issues of liberalism in connection with law 
and rights. He argued for a constitutional monarchy and strong state, and strongly opposed 
Aleksandr Gertsen (Hertzen to us) – a writer who spent much of his life in exile in England. 
He did, however, draw on both Russian and European experience and traditions. Another 
lawyer, P. I. Novgorodtsev (1866–1924), was the chief exponent of a natural law, Kantian 
approach to questions of the relationship between the individual and law. He too was strongly 
influenced by the Russian spiritual heritage. One of the latest proponents of this trend was N. 
A. Berdyaev (1874–1948), a member of the Vekhi group, whose manifesto collection of 
articles appeared in 190987, attracting the strongest criticism from Marxists and liberals alike.  
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For Berdyaev, inalienable human rights were the form of expression and existence on earth 
(Caesar’s kingdom) of personal freedom, that is of the transcendental (and godlike) 
phenomena of the kingdom of Spirit. In his book Gosudarstvo. Vlast i pravo. Iz istorii russkoi 
pravovoi mysli (The State. Power and law. From the history of Russian legal thought), 
Berdyaev wrote “The declaration of the rights of God and the declaration of human rights are 
one and the same declaration.” 
The point I wish to make by way of this brief survey is that there is a distinctively Russian 
approach to and thought about human rights which repays careful study by Western scholars. 
These are thinkers of the first rank. Moreover, the account above is sufficient to show that 
while it is possible to speak of Russian culture, and even of Russian legal culture, it would be 
a grave mistake to ignore the complex and dynamic interplay of Russian and Western 
European – especially Scottish! – histories and traditions. 
Conclusion 
I insist, as I have done in a number of publications88, that Russia’s unexpected accession to 
the CoE, established as the CoE was as an ideological opponent of the USSR and its allies, 
and its ratification of the ECHR, did not at all represent the transplantation of alien concepts 
and mechanisms into hostile Russian soil, but rather a restoration of reforms adopted in the 
19th century, as the result of the interaction between Russia and Western Europe, especially 
Scotland, in the 18th century. It is in this context that the discourse of international law, more 
particularly human rights law, between Russia and the CoE since 1996 must be understood. 
Russia is as much a Christian, and increasingly a Muslim, country as any Western European 
state, and has a rich history not only of legal and judicial reform but of intellectual contest 
concerning rights. 
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